Quick context: mobile security has been a recurring focus for me, a few articles and codelabs along the way.
PoisonStack is the latest, and the most specific I've gotten about the Android side.
Tl,DR: Don' t trust in any Plugin or fancy library you found, without read ALL the code. (same for AI skills)
A research artifact some of you might find interesting: three
deliberately malicious Android components written in Kotlin,
demonstrating that supply chain attacks against Android don't need
to be sophisticated.
- speedbuild-plugin: a Gradle plugin (afterEvaluate + Android
Transform with ASM) that scans local.properties, gradle.properties,
env and signing configs, and registers a Transform that identifies
Application.onCreate() as a bytecode-injection target.
- kryptokit: a KMP library whose kryptokit-core/build.gradle.kts
runs executeAttack() at top level — fires during dependency
resolution, before any task. Plus four independent crypto defects
in the runtime API: deterministic IV from hash(password), a
hardcoded BACKDOOR_KEY blended into every derived key, PBKDF2
iterations clamped to 1000, and "random" derived from
currentTimeMillis() % 10000.
- androidlens-plugin: an IntelliJ plugin (StartupActivity, no
permission system) that walks the project, probes
~/.aws/credentials / ~/.ssh/config / ~/.m2/settings.xml, and
builds an attacker briefing from Retrofit endpoint annotations.
None uses anything outside documented APIs. The thesis is that the
composition of "Gradle + dependency resolver + IntelliJ" doesn't
have an owner, and the unsophisticated version of each attack
already works.
Repo:
github.com/jacksonfdam/poisonstack
Four-part writeup:
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/trust-stack-four-part-series-jackson-f-de-a-mafra-ghryf
Research only. Everything that should exfiltrate writes to a local log file instead.
Do not ship any of it.